fix https://github.com/acmesh-official/acme.sh/issues/7195#issuecomment-5281002963

README.md

@@ -227,6 +227,31 @@ Cron entry example:
 acme.sh -h
 ```
 
+#### 🔏 Verify a Release
+
+Release tags from `3.1.5` on are signed with the maintainer's SSH key. The
+signing happens on the maintainer's machine, so the private key is never
+available to CI. The public half is [`allowed_signers`](allowed_signers) in
+this repository. From a clone:
+
+```bash
+git config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile allowed_signers
+```
+
+```bash
+git verify-tag 3.1.5
+```
+
+The signature covers the tag object, which pins the commit and therefore the
+whole tree, so a good signature verifies every file at that release and no
+separate tarball checksum is needed. Build a tarball from the verified tag:
+
+```bash
+git archive --format=tar.gz --prefix=acme.sh-3.1.5/ 3.1.5 > acme.sh-3.1.5.tar.gz
+```
+
+> ⚠️ Tags up to `3.1.4` predate the signing key and are unsigned.
+
 ---
 
 ### 2️⃣ Issue a Certificate

allowed_signers

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# acme.sh release signing key.
+#
+# Release tags are signed with this key. Its private half is held by the
+# maintainer and is never available to CI, so a compromise of the build
+# pipeline cannot produce a tag that verifies against this file.
+#
+# Fingerprint: SHA256:M60qVafm/NUywQHXAkoQcj2v6KgkfrdSXv6mPejUUeE
+#
+# To verify a release tag, from a clone of this repository:
+#
+#   git config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile allowed_signers
+#   git verify-tag 3.1.5
+#
+# A good signature covers the tag object, which pins the commit, which pins
+# the whole tree -- so verifying the tag verifies every file at that
+# release. Build a tarball from the verified tag with:
+#
+#   git archive --format=tar.gz --prefix=acme.sh-3.1.5/ 3.1.5 > acme.sh-3.1.5.tar.gz
+#
+github@neilpang.com namespaces="git" ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIBTjI0HBJn3uhfT2DsNcFybfAZi3ADbIacMpz1BItKdB